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oly. The concluding essay, by Auberon Herbert, endeavors to show "The True Line of Deliverance." The true line, as may be surmised, is open competition.

There is very little, if anything, in this collection of essays that has not been presented elsewhere. The work finds its justification in that it furnishes a convenient arsenal for the adversaries of socialism and state interference in connection with all the various phases of discussion at the present time.

WM. A. DUNNING.

An Introduction to Social Philosophy. By JOHN S. MACKENZIE, M.A. New York, Macmillan & Co., 1890. — 390 pp.

This book contains, in an expanded form, the substance of the Shaw Fellowship Lectures delivered by the author at the University of Edinburgh, in January, 1889. These lectures have been wrought up into several continuous essays, in which it is sought to develop and apply a metaphysic of social life, as distinguished from an empirical social science; the neo-Kantian way of looking at things furnishing the special philosophical standpoint.

The treatise opens with a carefully studied essay on the "Scope of Social Philosophy"; next unfolds the nature of the social problem, which calls for a philosophical treatment; and then presents the author's conceptions of "The Social Organism," "The Social Aim" and "The Social Ideal," with extended analysis and criticism of contrasted conceptions and aims. Finally, in a chapter on "The Elements of Social Progress," the special problems of the various practical sciences are more particularly discussed, in a consideration of the principles on which these sciences "must proceed in their efforts to determine the ideal of human progress and to contribute to its realization."

Each of the practical sciences,—economics, politics, ethics and education,—for the closer determination of its special problem, abstracts it from the general problem of the social welfare; hence a tendency to aberration or narrowness in conceptions in each sphere (notably marked, *e.g.*, in that of economics), which seems to call for the corrective and guiding influence of a comprehensive social philosophy. In practical life indeed, as well as in theory, an excessive tendency to specialization—an undue absorption in particular aims and interests—evinces the need of some mode of thinking which shall "place the various ends of life in their right relation to each other." And social philosophy, as Mr. Mackenzie conceives it, while dependent upon the particular sciences, can render to them needed services. Negatively, it can criticize the conceptions of which they make use, and endeavor

to define the place of each in relation to a larger whole. Positively, philosophy enables us at once to gain *ideas* of the principles by which objects are determined and *ideals* of their further determination. By the connected view of experience which it enables us to take, it "helps to suggest the real meaning of processes in which only a partial discovery has yet been made by the particular sciences." The ethical sciences could hardly exist without philosophy; "for here the whole question is one of what we mean or what we want to be at." "The facts are in such cases created by ourselves; and if our meaning changes, the facts change too." And as to social philosophy, the relations of human beings in society are more obviously liable to change in accordance with the development of their thoughts than the general laws of conduct are. It may be worth noting here how forcibly this view is supported by an observation in Professor Marshall's recent work on economics as to the historically evidenced effect of new ideals in gradually modifying human nature itself. While these ideals must wait on growth, Professor Marshall remarks, "they may always keep a little in advance of it, promoting the growth of our higher social nature, by giving it always some new and higher work to do, some practical ideal toward which to strive."¹

Under the caption, "The Social Problem," are considered the practical issues of the present time on which light is to be thrown by social philosophy. The well-being of people generally is the distinctive concern of the present time, as past periods have been interested peculiarly in that of the nation as a whole or of individuals in it. To raise up the humble and to teach the exalted how to use their power, is the problem,—whose urgency is not more evident than its difficulty. Society has passed the stage of subjugation and is in transition from that of liberation to the reorganization which is hardly yet beginning to show what course it may take. The people have won a liberty which seems so far to issue in another sort of bondage. The industrial civilization born of liberty has mastered its inventors; men are harnessed to things as never before, mind is subordinated to matter—even our ideas being dominated by mechanical ways of thinking. The fine personal relations of the old-time social world are dissolved; society is in a fluid state, and while there are signs of crystallization at one point and another, we do not yet see the way clear to the building up of a new and better order on the basis of the liberty that has been achieved. "There is nothing to control us, and we have not yet learned self-control."

What is needed is some principle of more perfect union; and the ideas which impress our author as most likely to be helpful are those

¹ Principles of Economics, I, 47.

of the organic nature of society and the spiritual nature of man. It is as combining the life of the parts with harmonious co-operation and development, not as involving any close analogy with biological facts and processes, that he would maintain society to be an organic whole. The social ideal as organic is opposed to monadistic independence and to monistic absorption of the individual, and the organic character is given by the psychical element in man. A philosophy which begins with Thought instead of Force, must make no mean account of Thought as a social factor; and Mr. Mackenzie, disregarding the most current fashions in sociological discussion, does not ignore or belittle the potency of mind in the social evolution. It is in the reflective rational consciousness, he thinks, that the organic unity of society is possible as an ideal. It is because man is a rational that he is a social animal. In leading up to the conclusion that man's true end is self-realization — by its very nature a social end — a criticism of other conceptions is given, especially, and *in extenso*, of the difficulties of hedonism in its various phases.

For realizing this end, it is inquired further what type or ideal of social living is under given conditions most favorable. A careful examination of various ideals — liberty, aristocracy and equality — brings out the good in each, while elucidating its difficulties and inadequacies. The conclusion is that the ideal for a progressing society is found in an organic combination of what is best in these ideals, *e.g.* such liberty as is needed for development, such socialism as would prevent the subjugation of man by material necessities and such aristocratic influence as is needed for wise social guidance. Yet over and above these elements, to constitute an organic union, is needed a combining principle — the recognition of vital relationships. Here indeed the true key-note of our social need is struck: the recognition of vital relationships not only between individuals, but between the various interests that are involved in their social life, is the urgent requisite for social well-being. The special fault of modern social life seems to be the abstraction of separate departments and interests from kinship or unity with each other.

Having this ideal in view, we are led at last to a consideration more in detail of the principles which should guide the economist, the politician and the educationist in the treatment of their special departments.

The economist, in considering the "subjugation of nature," is not likely to underrate the importance of material conquests. Social philosophy and literature have at times, in view of the blunders of civilization, put forth exaggerated protests such as that of Tolstoi against industrial tendencies; but only in further civilization, not in industrial retrogression, is a remedy for the errors to be looked for. What is needed, in the judgment of the author, is a more careful determination of the

directions in which it is desirable that the conquest of nature should be carried out. This means the determination of the true nature of wealth. The critic does not ignore the difficulty of making distinctions in economics between utilities as desired and as needed, since the recognition of other standards of wealth than that of the market introduces considerations which belong to other sciences. But in the opinion that economics have lost in practical value by neglecting to investigate the question of ultimate values, not to be estimated simply by liking, he is in line with recent economic thought. The increased attention which economists are giving to the consumption of wealth is in accord with his recommendation that luxury be made the subject of fuller investigation.

Naturally Mr. Mackenzie favors such a conception of economic science as includes social policy, and also such measures of state control as may be needed "not to hinder free competition, but to hinder it from becoming lawless."

Concerning the work of the politician and the educationist, the discussion is more brief and general, and its general tenor will readily be inferred. It would have been quite in the vein of the treatise, I think, to bring out more fully what is here and there suggested; *viz.*, that a true philosophy of social life, by bringing the different departments into a closer sense of mutual dependence for the efficient working out of their respective problems, might greatly help to foster "vital relationship" between individuals and interests. As an indication of what is intended it may suffice to quote Roscher's remark, that the repression of the individuality of the worker in modern industry is a tendency that strikes at the successful continuance of democracy itself.

To conclude: Mr. Mackenzie's work contains much valuable thought and abounds in felicities of expression. It constitutes a useful contribution to a needed discussion and should be followed up by more work upon similar lines. Certainly a need appears to exist for something more than a purely empirical study of society and for such unifying and insight-giving conceptions as an adequate philosophy of human nature may supply.

GEORGE B. NEWCOMB.